Discrediting the PMOI

Iran's Intelligence Ministry from its inception has aggressively targeted the PMOI.  As explained by Members of the European Parliament, the MOIS has a “long-running and sophisticated information campaign against the PMOI with the aim of tarnishing the organization within Iran, and more importantly, in the international community."

This assessment is shared by the intelligence agencies in the Netherlands and Germany.

A 2011 report by the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) of the Netherlands stated "Tehran's efforts to undermine the opposition People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran...in the Netherlands continued unabated in 2011."2  Specifically,

"In a campaign coordinated and financed by the Iranian intelligence services, the media and a number of politicians and other public servants were approached with a view to portraying the MEK in a highly negative light."3

Dutch intelligence has long monitored MOIS activities directed against the People's Mohahedin.  In a May 2002 report, the agency stated the PMOI was the main opposition group of interest for the MOIS, which sought to:

“...exert pressure on Western countries to condemn and ban this group [PMOI].  The Intelligence Ministry tries to gather information on the People’s Mohahedin Organization [and its members].  They are trying therefore, to destabilize the organization and demonize the Mohahedin in the host country and thus end their political and social activities.”4 

Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz – BFV) has also tracked MOIS activities in Europe.  In a 2000 report, it said: 

"The exiled Iranian opposition in Germany continues to remain in the focus of the reconnaissance activities of the Iranian Intelligence Services, VEVAK.  As in the past years, the Iranian Intelligence Service tries to recruit active or former members of opposition groups.  In many cases, this effort is accompanied by intimidation to put pressure on the person or on his relatives who live in Iran...."5

Using former resistance members to spread false information about the PMOI became a high priority for the MOIS after the 1991 Gulf War.  At the time, the Intelligence Ministry dramatically increased operations against the PMOI, hoping to completely shut down its main adversary.  It boosted its output of publications and articles attacking the PMOI and sent thousands of anti-Mojahedin letters to government officials accusing the resistance group of terrorism and murder of innocent civilians.

The following section highlights key attack websites linked to the MOIS that daily pepper the Internet with misleading and false information about the PMOI.  The publication section displays some of the books produced by the MOIS, or relay heavily on MOIS disinformation, that demonize the resistance organization.6


1) "People's Mojahedin of Iran."  Mission Report.  Friends of a Free Iran.  European Parliament.  September 21, 2005.

2) "Annual Report 2011." General Intelligence and Security Service, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.  2011.

3) Ibid.

4) "Spying for the Mullahs: Iran's Agents in UK."  British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom.  October 2007.

5) Ibid.

6) "The Clerical Regime's Disinformation Agencies." NCRI.  June 14, 2005.